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Abstract
Existing research has argued that terrorism is common in civil war because it is
“effective.” Surprisingly, however, only some groups use terrorism during civil wars,
while many refrain altogether. We also see considerable variation in the use of
terrorism over time. This article presents a theory of terrorism as a mobilization
strategy in civil war, taking into account benefits, costs, and temporal dynamics.
We argue that the choice and the timing of terrorism arise from the interaction
between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. Terrorism
can mobilize support when it provokes indiscriminate government repression or
when it radicalizes rebels’ constituency by antagonizing specific societal groups.
The timing of attacks, however, is influenced by battlefield losses, which increase
rebels’ need to rally civilian support. The analyses of new disaggregated data on
rebels’ terrorist attacks during conflicts (1989–2009) and of ISIS tactics in Iraq and
Syria support our theoretical argument.
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Introduction
In 2017, 10 organizations alone were responsible for 4,282 terrorist attacks, amounting
to approximately 40 percent of all attacks and 68 percent of all terrorist fatalities in
that year (17,915 victims).1 Nine of these organizations have been involved in civil wars,
which have now become the main source of global terrorism (Findley and Young 2012).
Many have argued that groups in conflict use terrorism because it “works” (e.g. Kydd
and Walter 2006; Pape 2003). For example, terrorism may increase groups’ chances of
entering into negotiations and obtaining government concessions, and help to advertise
the group’s cause to a large audience (e.g. Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014).
However, a closer look at insurgent groups’ actual use of terrorism in civil conflicts2
reveals two surprising patterns. While some groups carry out a large number of attacks,
nearly 50 percent of all insurgent groups active between 1970 and 2011 never resorted to
terrorism. Moreover, among groups that employ terrorism, there is considerable temporal
variation in its use. Figure 1 illustrates this variation for a sample of groups engaged in
civil war during the past eight years. It is clear that terror tactics are not used regularly,
with attacks being concentrated at specific times and almost absent at others. Given the
existing arguments about terrorism’s effectiveness, it is puzzling that terrorism is not used
more often and by all rebel groups. Why, then, do some rebel groups resort to terror
tactics, while others refrain from doing so? And what explains the timing of terrorist
attacks in civil war?
Despite a growing body of work on terrorism in civil war, the existing research only
provides incomplete answers to these questions. Studies have pointed to several factors
associated with terrorism such as regime type, rebel capabilities, funding sources, ideology,
intergroup competition, and organizational structures (e.g. Belgioioso 2018; Fortna, Lotito
1Ten organizations represented 3 percent of all organizations active in 2017 (GTD 2016).
2We use the following terms interchangebly: “civil war” and “civil conflict,”“insurgents”
and “rebels groups.”
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Figure 1 Patterns of terrorism by rebel groups over time
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
N
um
be
r o
f t
er
ro
ris
t a
tta
ck
s
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Free Syrian Army (FSA)
Ansar Allah Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA)
and Rubin 2018; Hultman 2007; Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Stanton 2013). Although
important, these factors tend to be rather static and cannot explain variation in the use
and frequency of terrorism by rebel groups over time. To date, the timing of terrorism in
civil war remains largely unexplained. Moreover, many existing studies tend to emphasize
the benefits of terrorism while downplaying its costs, especially the risk that terrorism
will backfire by alienating civilians (see also Fortna 2015). Most rebel groups rely on
some form of local civilian support (Kalyvas 2006). As a result, it remains unclear why,
and when, groups that depend on popular support can benefit from resorting to terror
tactics.
In this article, we present a theory of terrorism as a mobilization strategy in civil
war. This theory aims to explain not only why some rebel groups resort to terrorism
(and many others refrain from doing so) but also when they do so—that is, the timing
of terrorist attacks. Drawing on a rationalist framework, we regard terrorism as a tool
to help rebels achieve proximate rather than ultimate goals. Winning the support of
the local population is a key proximate goal for rebel organizations. We argue that
rebel groups seeking to drum up popular support employ terrorism as an instrument of
mobilization. Building on seminal research by Lake (2002), Kydd and Walter (2006), and
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Goodwin (2006), we identify the logics of provocation and boundary activation as key
mechanisms of mobilization. Rebel groups use terrorist attacks to provoke indiscriminate
government repression and to radicalize their core constituency by exacerbating in-group
out-group cleavages. These mechanisms, however, are not straightforward and are fraught
with risks. Terrorism may generate selective government responses that can be lethal for
rebels (Carter 2016) and entail significant political costs, such as the alienation of civilians.
We explicitly incorporate such risks and identify two conditions under which terrorism is
more likely to be effective in mobilizing civilians. When rebel groups fight a government
that is susceptible to provocation due to a history of indiscriminately repressive policies,
groups can leverage government responses to overcome collective action problems and
mobilize fence-sitters against the incumbent. Terrorism is also beneficial when there
is a strong out-group antagonism within rebels’ core constituency. Insurgents can then
exploit provocative attacks against out-groups to radicalize their support-base and reduce
the risk of abandonment or backlash.
However, mobilization mechanisms per se do not tell us when rebels are more likely
to resort to terrorism—that is, the timing of attacks. We argue that terrorist mobilization
strategies are more likely to be triggered when other, less risky options become too costly
or unfeasible. This happens, specifically, when rebel groups experience major losses on
the battlefield. The death of rebel combatants directly reduces the membership size of a
rebel organization and can lead to a further loss of resources (e.g. territory). Moreover,
adverse outcomes on the battlefield are observed by the rebels’ constituency, which may
feel frustrated and whose commitment may begin to falter. These effects put pressure
on the rebel leadership who needs to reinvigorate support for the rebel movement and
attract new rebel fighters. Following major losses, rebels’ need to mobilize and consolidate
support is greatest; alternative strategies, such as providing social services, simultaneously
become less feasible. It is precisely at this point that rebels are more likely to use terrorism
as a means of provocation and boundary activation. We argue, however, that the effect
of losses is strictly conditional. Losses trigger terrorism and shape the timing of attacks
only when rebels are optimistic about the positive effect of terrorism on support. When
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rebels expect a backlash they will not resort to terrorism, despite having suffered major
military losses. Thus, the choice and timing of terrorism in civil war are the product of
the interaction between conditions for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics.
We test our theory using a two-pronged research design. First, we conduct a large-N
analysis leveraging an original monthly-level dataset on rebel terrorism (1970-2011) that
links rebel groups in the UCDP Georeferenced Events Dataset (Sundberg and Melander
2013) with organizations and attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2016).
Through this analysis we test the conditions under which rebel groups resort to terrorism
and whether temporal variation in attacks results from specific battlefield dynamics.
Second, we complement the macro-analysis with a quantitative case-study on the terrorist
strategies of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This allows us to test our
mobilization mechanism with more granular data. We find robust support for our
theoretical argument at both the macro and micro levels.
This study has significant implications for our understanding of terrorism as an
insurgent tactic and of its embeddedness in strategic environments such as civil wars.
First, by focusing on terrorism as an instrument of mobilization, and by identifying
specific conditions under which terrorism is both effective and necessary for generating
civilian support, we systematically account for variation in the use of terrorism across
conflicts, rebel groups, and time.
Second, we introduce an important dynamic component to models of terrorism by
explicitly examining the timing of terrorist attacks during civil wars. We do so through
the analysis of the relationship between terrorism and specific battlefield dynamics, which
have been largely overlooked in recent studies of terrorism. In doing so, this research
provides evidence of a crucial dilemma for governments engaged in intrastate conflicts.
Those rebel groups that are able to leverage terrorism as a mobilization strategy may
take a very long time to defeat. Inflicting major battlefield losses on these groups is likely
to backfire by increasing their incentives to unleash terrorist violence.
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Third, in contrast to previous rationalist explanations (e.g. Hultman 2007; Pape
2003; Wood and Kathman 2014), our argument highlights not only the benefits but also
the political costs of terrorism. We show that while these costs can be substantial—which
explains why many non-state actors choose to avoid terrorism—they are also not uniform
across rebel groups. Conditional on military losses on the battlefield, some groups can
capitalize on repressive government policies and on the attitudes of their constituency to
maximize the impact of terrorist violence and drum up support.
Finally, our empirical approach, with new time-varying data at the group and micro
levels, allows us to examine the dynamics of terrorism in civil war in ways that were not
previously possible.
Benefits, costs, and dynamics of terrorism
Terrorism is the “premeditated use of violence by subnational groups” against public,
noncombatant targets “to obtain a political objective through the intimidation of a large
audience beyond the immediate victims” (Enders and Sandler 2012, 3). Terrorism often
occurs in the context of civil war; in fact, at least 50 percent of global terrorist attacks
are civil war related (Findley and Young 2012; Polo and Gleditsch 2016; Stanton 2013).
However, terrorism differs from other forms of violence against noncombatants during
civil wars in that the ultimate aim of terrorism is to influence the government and
not the immediate physical victims of attacks. For example, as Fortna (2015, 523)
highlights, “an attack on a public market is intended to influence the government, not
shoppers.” This characteristic of indirect targeting further differentiates terrorism from
direct violence intended to carry out political and ethnic cleansing, punish collaboration
with the opponent, or extract resources (Balcells 2010; Fjelde and Hultman 2014; Kalyvas
2006; Wood 2014).3
3All these forms of violence against civilians are therefore outside the scope of this study.
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Civil conflict scholars are increasingly seeking to understand rebel terrorism. The
burgeoning literature on terrorism in civil war explores a number of factors such as regime
type (Stanton 2013), rebel capabilities (Hultman 2007; Polo and Gleditsch 2016), rebel
group goals (Akcinaroglu and Tokdemir 2018), intergroup competition (Belgioioso 2018),
rebel funding sources (Fortna, Lotito and Rubin 2018), peace processes and mediation
attempts (Findley and Young 2015; Pospieszna and DeRouen Jr 2017), and coercive
vs. conciliatory state behavior (Asal et al. 2019). This work is important but it often
downplays two aspects: the potential for terrorism to alienate popular support for rebels
and the temporal dynamics of terrorist violence, especially the timing of terrorist attacks
during civil wars.
Rebels interact not only with the government but also with civilian audiences. Most
rebel groups in civil war rely on local support from the population. Even radical Islamist
groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) recognize the importance of
local support and urge combatants to marry local women in order to strengthen such
ties (Carnegie Middle East Center 2016). Many existing studies tend to emphasize how
terrorism can impose costs on the government and signal resolve but do not systematically
address the consequences of terrorism for popular support, especially the risk of alienating
civilians (Fortna 2015). Research that explicitly takes into account the potentially
counterproductive effects of terrorism suggests that rebel groups that rely on local support
should be less likely to use terrorism. However, the empirical record is far more mixed
and many organizations that rely on local support also engage in terrorism (e.g. Polo
Forthcoming). Others have argued that the use of terrorism is due to dynamics internal to
the organization such as principal-agent problems or socialization mechanisms (Abrahms
and Potter 2015; Davis and Jang 2018), but this implies that the decision to engage
in terrorism may not be strategic. Given that most insurgent organizations ultimately
want (and depend on) public support, it remains unclear why they would strategically
engage in indiscriminate targeting such as terrorism. Several rationalist explanations
suggest that rebel groups engage in terrorism despite their need for popular support due
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to terrorism’s ability to impose costs and its coercive effect on government behavior.4
Yet it is puzzling that terrorism does not appear to help rebels win a civil war or achieve
negotiated settlements (Fortna 2015).5
In contrast, we adopt an alternative approach—namely, that rebel groups use
terrorism not despite depending on civilian support but precisely because they depend on
it. Put differently, rebels use terrorism as a mobilization strategy to win and consolidate
the support of the population. Although it has received limited attention in the civil war
literature, the notion that terrorism can be employed to garner support is not new to
the terrorism literature. For example, work by Kydd and Walter (2006), Lake (2002),
and Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) examines how terrorism can be used to
provoke the government into extreme responses that can shift support away from the
incumbent. What has not been systematically addressed, however, is the possibility
that such provocation backfires and how this, in turn, affects rebels’ choice of when and
whether to adopt terrorism. As Carter (2016) notes, provocation can be lethal for rebels
if the government responds with selective violence. Additionally, if mobilization through
terrorism were a costless and generally effective strategy we would expect many more
rebels to resort to terrorism and to do so at all times, but this is not the case. As a result,
we need to better understand when and under what conditions rebel groups are able to
effectively use terrorism as an instrument of mobilization.
This leads to the crucial issue of timing. Despite their important contributions,
existing explanations of terrorism in civil war tend to focus on rather static, structural
factors, whereas rebels’ use of terrorism varies significantly over time, even in the short
term. The temporal dynamics of terrorism in civil war remain largely unaccounted for.
To understand why rebels resort to terrorism, we need to understand when they do so
4This is the implied rationale behind attrition and spoiling strategies (Kydd and Walter
2006; Pape 2003).
5However see Thomas (2014) on the effect of terrorism on negotiations.
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and how the choice of terrorism is influenced by the changing dynamics of the conflict.
Accounting for the timing of terrorism is also important because rebels can choose from a
broader set of tactics and strategies, besides terrorism. Simply examining why terrorism
might appear as an attractive option to a rational non-state actor under some structural
circumstances is insufficient. We need to explain why and when rebels fail to implement
alternative strategies that they would prefer to terrorism (see also Belgioioso 2018, 641).
The lack of an explicit temporal dimension also characterizes extant arguments about
terrorist mobilization (e.g. provocation). When are rebel groups more or less likely to use
terrorism as a mobilization tool? How does terrorism as a mobilization tool work during
a civil war? As Findley and Young (2012) note, the strategy of provocation as a means
to rally support for would-be rebels is quite plausible before the beginning of a civil war,
but it is much less clear how and when this operates once a civil war is underway, which
is when we actually observe the majority of terrorist attacks.
Regarding empirical analyses, examining temporal variation in rebel terrorism and
its relationship to civil war dynamics has so far been hampered, at least in part, by the lack
of available data. The new data presented in this study, which link actors and events in the
Global Terrorism Database with actors and events in the UCDP Geo-referenced Events
Dataset (GED) allow us to overcome this problem. Moreover, in the empirical section we
present both macro- and micro-level approaches to capturing temporal variation in the
use of terrorism and connect this to rebels’ mobilization strategies.
The political logic of terrorism in civil wars
Drawing on a rationalist understanding of violence, we assume that insurgent groups
use violent tactics as a means to achieve their goals. Organizations typically pursue
some maximal goal—for example, regime change or secession. Such goals, however, are
usually a long-term prospect (Cunningham, Dahl and Fruge´ 2018, 593). Besides maximal
goals, organizations also have proximate goals. These include “attracting and retaining
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supporters, gaining international and domestic attention and support, and demonstrating
mobilization capacity” to undermine the state’s authority (ibid.). Given these dual and
complementary goals, insurgents’ choice of tactic is not simply informed by a desire to
achieve the group’s ultimate aims. Instead, insurgent groups recognize the usefulness
of tactics that help them attain proximate goals. For example, terrorist tactics helped
groups such as al-Qaida in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan to rally supporters among
Sunnis and Pashtuns. Spectacular terrorist campaigns allowed ISIS to attract substantial
international attention and recruit an unprecedented number of foreign fighters. These
outcomes may be viewed as successes even though the groups did not obtain major
concessions (Fishman 2016b).
In line with these considerations, our framework for understanding the use of
terrorism in civil war focuses on the link between terrorist tactics and rebels’ pursuit
of proximate goals. Mobilizing popular support is a critical proximate goal for groups
engaged in civil war (Johnson 1962). Civilians provide human and material resources that
increase rebel groups’ resilience and power to resist. We argue that rebels use terrorism as
a political strategy to mobilize support. This strategy follows a dual logic of recruitment
of new supporters and radicalization of existing ones. Within this framework, terrorism
operates as a complement to other violent tactics rather than as a substitute for them.
For example, a group may use terrorism while simultaneously engaging in conventional
or guerrilla attacks. The logic of terrorism in civil war therefore results from political
rather than purely military considerations.
To develop our argument on terrorism as an instrument of mobilization we build
on seminal work by Lake (2002), Kydd and Walter (2006), and Goodwin (2006). We
focus on two mechanisms: provocation and boundary activation. Rebel groups use
terrorist attacks strategically to provoke indiscriminate government repression and to
radicalize their core constituency by exacerbating out-group hostility. At the same time,
these processes are not straightforward and are fraught with risks. Terrorism may entail
significant costs, particularly the risk of a public backlash and the alienation of civilians.
We add to previous work by incorporating such costs into a theory of terrorist mobilization
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and identifying the conditions under which rebels can effectively use terrorism as an
instrument of mobilization. Moreover, we address temporal variation in the use of
terrorism by identifying when mechanisms of provocation and boundary activations are
triggered during conflict, given that rebel groups can rely on alternative strategies of
mobilization (e.g. Mampilly 2011). Thus, our mobilization argument explicitly accounts
for the timing of terrorism, which is central to uncovering the political logic of terrorist
attacks in civil war. In the following sections we discuss how the interaction between
conditions for effective mobilization and specific battlefield dynamics can explain both
the choice and timing of terrorism in civil war.
The choice of terrorism: conditions for effective mobilization
Rebels’ ability to mobilize popular support through terrorist attacks depends critically on
how the government responds to terrorism. Research has shown that if the government
responds with indiscriminate repression, the targeted population is more likely to
withdraw its support for the incumbent (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kydd
and Walter 2006; Lake 2002; Thomas 2014). This provocation strategy allows insurgents
to mobilize fence-sitters in favor of the insurgents’ cause. Even government sympathizers
may revise their preferences once they are caught in indiscriminate, state-led reprisals.
Collective targeting based on ethnicity or religion is also damaging for the government
because civilians realize that they can be punished and killed by association despite not
being actively involved in the insurgency (Kalyvas 2006). As a consequence, free-riding
(i.e. remaining on the fence) is no longer a viable option (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).
In addition, governments are usually militarily stronger than the rebels and when they
exercise indiscriminate repression they tend to cause a greater number of casualties (Fjelde
and Hultman 2014). Faced with violence from both sides, civilians are likely to turn to
the lesser evil—namely, the insurgents.
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However, governments differ in their responses to terrorism and not all governments
use large-scale repression when facing terrorist groups.6 Some governments have the
technology and willingness to be selective, and use counterinsurgency strategies aimed
at “winning the hearts and minds” of the population (e.g. Berman, Shapiro and Felter
2011). Given that not all governments are equally susceptible to provocation, how can
insurgents anticipate government responses to terrorism?
We argue that government’s past behavior constitutes a useful heuristic that allows
insurgents to determine whether the government will engage in indiscriminate repression,
and hence the likely effectiveness of a terrorist provocation strategy. Governments
that have previously established a reputation for repression or previously demonstrated
a propensity to repress the population indiscriminately—independent of the ongoing
conflict—are more likely to respond to terrorist attacks in a similar way. These
governments develop and maintain institutions specialized in the exercise of violent
coercion and are characterized by political cultures that sanction the use of violence in
response to challenges and perceived threats (Gurr 1988). When the target government
is already feared by the population, extreme responses can further radicalize that
population and increase support for the rebels. On the other hand, in the absence of
prior indiscriminate repression insurgents will be less optimistic that they can force the
government to engage in “bad behavior” and more concerned about the risk of a backlash.
A measured government response also belies insurgents’ claim that the government is
oppressive and illegitimate, and that it should be removed.
Moreover, when using terrorist attacks as an instrument of mobilization, rebel groups
pay attention to the effects of terrorism on their core constituency—namely, those people
who already have a reason to support the insurgency. While rebel groups have a strong
6Governments may commit extreme human right violations due to very weak (or
non-existent) constraints on domestic repression or simply because they lack the
technology and resources to be selective (Blankenship 2018).
11
interest in radicalizing their constituency, they must also avoid being punished by their
supporters for the use of terrorist violence. This can occur, for instance, if insurgents are
blamed for exposing their population to government retaliation or if terrorism is perceived
as tarnishing the legitimacy of the group’s political cause. Constituents’ perception of
rebel groups’ intentions and behavior when they launch terrorist campaigns plays a critical
role in the success of rebels’ mobilization efforts. In this regard, group-based identification
can significantly shape civilian attitudes toward combatants. Out-group antagonism, in
particular, indicates the tendency to systematically view the actions of one’s in-group
favorably and the actions of the out-group negatively. This occurs especially when
insurgents have strong, exclusive ties with a specific ethnic or ethnoreligious group (Lyall,
Blair and Imai 2013). Insurgents can then exploit this relationship to foster constituency
support and reduce the risk of abandonment or backlash.
A strong in-group out-group cleavage facilitates terrorist mobilization efforts and
reduces the likelihood that insurgents will be punished for terrorist attacks for several
reasons. First, as Goodwin (2006) suggests, ethnic and religious identities allow insurgents
to concentrate terrorist attacks on civilians from the out-group and avoid targeting
potential in-group supporters. Second, in the presence of out-group antagonism rebel
terrorist attacks against members of the out-group are rewarded with increased support
from the in-group. In fact, shared identity ties based on ethnicity or religion provide a
heuristic for assessing the good intentions of insurgents and whether their actions are for
the good of the group. Moreover, individuals have a demonstrated tendency to cooperate
with members of their own ethnic group rather than across ethnic boundaries (co-ethnic
bias). This tendency persists even when individuals are exposed to significant wartime
violence and face high security risks (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013).
Besides the above-mentioned legitimizing effects (Goodwin 2006), there is another
important mechanism through which terrorism can mobilize support in the presence
of out-group antagonism. When terrorist attacks cause increased discrimination or
even repression against insurgents’ proclaimed in-group, the insurgents can exploit such
responses to generate a form of boundary activation and radicalize members of their
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constituency (Tilly 2003). In fact, when people trust their ethnic or religious kin more
than they trust others, terrorist violence can be leveraged to polarize a society and turn
the conflict itself into a sectarian one, a struggle of us against them. In this scenario,
in-group civilians are forced to take the insurgents’ side and seek protection from their
“own kind”, even if they initially favored a nonviolent approach. This strategy was
adopted by, among others, al-Qaida in Iraq following the US invasion. In a 2004 letter
to Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the leader of the organization, laid out his
proposal for provoking such a sectarian conflict. He called for “terrorist attacks against
the Shiite majority population that would lead to a harsh government crackdown on the
Sunni minority” (Hussain 2015, 1). This, in turn, would radicalize the Sunni population
and persuade them to view al-Qaida in Iraq as their only protector (Hussain 2015, 1).
Not all insurgent groups, however, can rely on ethnoreligious biases to exploit, or
activate, sectarian cleavages. When insurgent organizations and the government draw
supporters from a common pool and not based on ascriptive identities, their perceived
constituencies at least partially overlap. In these circumstances insurgents face greater
difficulty in using terrorism to elicit support from fence-sitters because they cannot rely
on strong identity ties and co-ethnic biases. The inability to identify a clear out-group
increases the risk that terrorist attacks will target potential supporters, with major
political losses for the rebels. Thus, when insurgents compete with the incumbent for
legitimacy as ruling actors over a large and diverse population, they have a strong
incentive to avoid terrorist attacks. To illustrate, consider the violent strategies of the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Unlike ISIS and al-Nusra,
these insurgent groups are multiethnic and multireligious, and also comprise defected
members of Bashar al-Assad’s regime (Lister 2016). Their fight focuses on overthrowing
Assad’s rule and establishing a democratic state for all ethnicities and social identities.
The FSA and SDA rely primarily on conventional and guerrilla warfare tactics and have
generally avoided terrorism (Hanna 2016).
In civil war, the success of mobilization through terrorism hinges on the responses
of the government and of the rebels’ constituency. Rebel groups are incentivized to
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resort to terrorism when they are optimistic about their ability to provoke government
crackdowns on potential and actual supporters or when they can activate sectarian
hostilities that radicalize and lock in support from their core constituency. We have
identified two key antecedent conditions for the effectiveness of this mobilization strategy:
a history of indiscriminate government repression and a strong out-group antagonism
between rebel and government constituencies. In the next section we discuss how the
interaction between these conditions and specific battlefield dynamics influences the
timing of terrorism.
The timing of terrorism: utility over alternatives
Mobilizing support by provoking repression or sectarian conflicts is of course risky
and, more importantly, there are other ways in which rebel groups can generate
support. For example, rebels can co-opt the civilian population with nonviolent tactics
such as social service provision (e.g. Mampilly 2011). However, these other tactics,
which minimize political costs, are resource intensive. Providing governance requires
considerable material, financial, and human resources.7 In contrast, terrorist attacks
require significantly fewer resources. Given the permissive conditions we have highlighted
above, terrorism is most beneficial as a mobilization tool when other, less risky options
for mobilization become too costly, and hence unfeasible.
This leads to the question of the timing of terrorism. We argue that negative
shocks to rebel human and material resources generated by major military losses on the
battlefield, create the optimal window of opportunity for terrorist attacks. The timing of
terrorism is thus defined by events on the battlefield that impact rebel groups’ ability to
rally support and signal strength using alternative means.
7Some rebel groups that are unable or unwilling to provide governance may resort to forced
recruitment and direct civilian victimization. In the robustness checks we explicitly
address this possibility and its implications for the use of terrorism as a mobilizing tool.
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Major losses influence rebels’ mobilization strategies, and the use of terrorism, in
two ways. The killing of rebel combatants directly reduces the membership of a rebel
organization and can lead to a further loss of resources, including having weapons and
territory seized by the opponent. Losses therefore increase the salience of recruiting new
members and mobilizing civilians. But losses also have indirect effects. Adverse outcomes
on the battlefield not only affect the rebel organization but are also observed by the
rebels’ actual or potential constituency. Rebel supporters may feel frustrated by losses
and subsequently reduce their commitment since their start questioning the insurgency’s
future viability. This puts pressure on the rebel leadership, which needs to secure support
for the rebel movement and attract new rebel fighters. However, providing services as a
private reward for support becomes difficult when rebels are suffering major losses (Regan
and Norton 2005). Following such losses, rebels’ need to mobilize and consolidate support
is greatest while strategies alternative to terrorism are hardly feasible. It is precisely at
this point that terrorism is most likely to make a difference and more likely to be used as
a means of provocation and boundary activation. In contrast, when groups are successful
on the battlefield they have arguably already mobilized enough support and resources,
which should reduce the need to rely on terrorist tactics. As a result, terrorist attacks
are not used regularly but will tend to cluster temporally during conflict.
However, while military losses can help us explain the timing of terrorist attacks
during civil war, they are insufficient, on their own, to explain rebels’ choice of terrorism.
In other words, rebel organizations that experience battle losses can react differently based
on factors that affect the level of mobilization in their favor. We therefore emphasize the
conditional logic of terrorism as a mobilization strategy. The effect of military losses
on the timing of terrorism is conditional on the expected effect of terrorism on support,
which is influenced by government behavior and out-group antagonism. This means
that when rebels are pessimistic about the effectiveness of terrorism as a mobilization
tool, and anticipate a backlash, they will not resort to this tactic even if they recently
suffered major military losses. Our argument thus constitutes an important departure
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from previous studies that regard terrorism as a weapon of desperate groups on the verge
of military defeat (e.g. Hultman 2007; Wood 2014).
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Rebel groups are more likely to resort to terrorism when they
have suffered severe military losses and there is a history of indiscriminate government
repression against the population.
Hypothesis 2 : Rebel groups are more likely to resort to terrorism when they have
suffered severe military losses and there is strong out-group antagonism between the
rebels’ constituency and the rest of the population.
Data and research design
We test our theoretical expectations using monthly-level data on rebel groups’ terrorist
attacks and battle-events during conflicts. Information on active conflicts between
insurgent and government forces comes from the UCDP Georeferenced Events Dataset
(Sundberg and Melander 2013). We link insurgent groups from this dataset with terrorist
organizations in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2016) to identify whether rebel
organizations engage in terrorist attacks in each conflict-month. To match organizations,
and avoid overcounting terrorist attacks, we follow the same procedure as Polo and
Gleditsch (2016). We code only those organizations that appear in both datasets with
the same or very similar names as a match.8 Our data includes 205 rebel groups in the
regions of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa from 1989 to 2009.9 The unit of observation
is rebel group-conflict month.
8See appendix A4 for details on the coding rules.
9Regional and temporal coverage is determined by Sundberg and Melander (2013) and
information on rebels’ external support is determined by Ho¨gbladh, Pettersson and
Themne´r (2011). The actual estimation sample includes 153 groups.
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We apply a conventional definition of terrorism based on the fulfillment of the three
criteria outlined by the GTD (see codebook, 10). A terrorist attack is the intentional use
of force to coerce, intimidate, or convey a message to larger audiences than the immediate
victims; it has a political, economic, religious, or social goal; and it takes place outside
legitimate warfare activities. This definition captures the targeting of noncombatants
while it excludes attacks against military targets, which we regard as instances of guerrilla
warfare.
We operationalize rebel groups’ use of terrorism via three distinctive dependent
variables. The first is a binary variable measuring whether the rebel group committed
any terrorist attack in a given conflict-month (i.e. occurrence). The second indicates
the number of attacks a rebel group perpetrated in a given month. The third dependent
variable, number of victims, captures the count of victims generated by rebel terrorist
attacks in each month. In addition, we put our theory to an additional test by considering
a more restrictive version of the dependent variable that only includes terrorist attacks
against soft civilian targets. The variable only comprises private citizens, and excludes
official targets and attacks on infrastructure.
We argue that there are two political conditions that favor insurgent’s use of
terrorism as a mobilization tactic: previous indiscriminate government repression and
out-group antagonism. We define government repression as the extent and severity with
which physical integrity rights violations are routinely implemented against the civilian
population not directly involved in dissent. To measure the government’s past repressive
behavior, we draw on the Political Terror Scale (PTS) five-point scale, where higher
values reflect increasingly widespread and indiscriminate repression (Wood and Gibney
2010).10 The variable repression consists of a four-year moving average of the PTS values
10We use the PTS rather than the CIRI data because the latter includes targeted
repression and, unlike the PTS, does not allow us to single out instances of
indiscriminate repression.
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between t-2 and t-5. This allows us to capture the government’s past repressive strategies
over an extended period of time and the extent to which the government has displayed a
consistent tendency to indiscriminately repress civilians.11
Drawing on research on civilian wartime attitudes (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013), we
consider out-group antagonism to be present when rebel groups have strong, exclusive
ties with a specific ethnic or religious group. Unlike previous studies which have
examined group goals/ideologies, we code out-group antagonism based on whether rebel
organizations claim to represent as well as recruit or receive support from a specific
ethnic or religious group. Such a group is then identified as the insurgents’ constituency,
while others—including the government’s constituency—are the out-group. Our coding
rule excludes cases where both rebels and the government make competing claims or
recruit from the same ethnic group. Data for this variable is drawn from the ACD2EPR
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2012) and complemented with our own coding of religious groups.
We recognize that an ideal test would also include information on the ethnicity of terrorist
targets. Unfortunately, such data do not currently exist and it is not feasible to code
thousands of attacks and group-years. In the micro-level analysis of ISIS terrorism we
specifically examine the ethnic identity of targets and provide more fine-grained evidence.
Based on our argument, the timing of terrorist attacks is influenced by major military
losses which increase insurgents’ need to mobilize support and limit the feasibility of
alternative tactics. To operationalize this we combine time-varying information on rebel
group troop size from Wood (2014) and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia together with
data on the number of rebel battle-related deaths per conflict month (UCDP GED). We
calculate the proportion of rebel troops lost in battle relative to the group’s troop size in
11The PTS is independent of government changes and captures repression in peace and
conflict years.
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each month of active conflict.12 Relative rebel losses is a continuous, time-varying variable
that captures the severity of insurgents losses throughout the conflict. We lag the variable
by one month to guard against losses that possibly follow increases in terrorism.
We control for several potential confounders that may affect rebel groups’ decisions to
engage in terrorism during conflict. At the actor level, we control for relative government
losses (Wood 2014). Inflicting large losses on the government could be seen as a proxy
for insurgents’ battlefield effectiveness and consequently as an incentive to refrain from
terrorism. Rebel group competition measures the number of competing rebel organizations
active in the same conflict, as this may influence the broader strategic environment.
We use rebel centralized leadership to account for the rebel groups’ type of command
structure and the possible influence of principal-agent problems (Abrahms and Potter
2015). We distinguish between groups with a strong centralized leadership and those that
are internally factionalized (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). In addition to
the internal structure, rebel groups’ access to outside material and financial resources may
further influence incentives for terrorism; hence, we control for whether groups receive
external support (Ho¨gbladh, Pettersson and Themne´r 2011).
At the conflict level, the variable conflict intensification measures the overall increase
in the conflict’s intensity relative to the previous month. Furthermore, we control for
territorial conflicts, as holding territory influences rebel strategies. To take into account
the institutional setting of the country where the conflict takes place, we control for the
level of democracy using the Xpolity measure proposed by Vreeland (2008). Finally, we
include GDP per capita to account for the country’s level of development at the time of
the conflict (Gleditsch 2002). Table A1 in the appendix presents summary statistics for
the variables described above.
12Looking only at the sheer number of deaths in battles would be insufficient since larger
insurgent groups are better able to absorb such losses than smaller organizations.
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We use different estimation procedures given the three distinctive dependent
variables. We employ a logit regression for the occurrence of terrorist attacks and negative
binomials for the count variables number of attacks and number of victims. All models
include the cubic polynomial of time since the last terrorist attack perpetrated by the rebel
group to control for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). We cluster the
standard errors on the rebel group to account for the non-independence of observations
within each group over time.13
Results
We have argued that terrorism is used as a mobilization strategy in civil war under specific
political conditions. Groups that can exploit terrorism either to provoke indiscriminate
government repression or to activate sectarian cleavages stand to benefit the most from
terrorist tactics. We also argue that terrorism is most useful as a mobilization tool
following major military losses, when other less risky options for mobilization become too
costly. Hence, the occurrence of terrorism is shaped by the interaction between conditions
for effective mobilization and battlefield dynamics. In this section we present the results
of our empirical analysis, focusing on variation in terrorism across groups and over time.
Before turning to the empirical models, we first present some descriptive evidence
on the relationship between our key variables—state repression, out-group antagonism,
and military losses—and insurgents’ adoption of terrorism. Aproximately 46 percent
of the groups in our sample had never used terrorism.14 Moreover, counter to the
13Substantive effects are calculated using Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000),
holding continuous variables constant at their means and categorical variables at their
modes.
14For example, the Sudan Liberation Movement, the Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy, or the United Tajik Opposition.
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Table 1 Mobilization opportunities and terrorism for rebel groups with military losses
Repression
Terrorism No Yes Total
No 69.39 45.45 52.83
(34) (50) (84)
Yes 30.61 54.55 47.17
(15) (60) (75)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
(49) (110) (159)
Out-group antagonism
Terrorism No Yes Total
No 67.86 44.66 52.83
(38) (46) (84)
Yes 32.14 55.34 47.17
(18) (57) (75)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
(56) (103) (159)
Note: Values are column percentages with observations in parentheses.
conventional wisdom that regards terrorism as a weapon of the weak, approximately
53 percent of rebel groups had not resorted to terrorism despite having suffered military
losses. As Table 1 illustrates, groups that suffered losses were more likely to use terrorism
when the government had previously used indiscriminate repression (PTS moving average
score greater than 4, averaged across years) and when they exhibited strong out-group
antagonism. These patterns provide initial support for our argument on the interaction
of political opportunities for mobilization and military losses. To examine the empirical
patterns more systematically we turn to the statistical analyses.
Table 2 presents the results for the first hypothesis. We include an interaction
term between the continuous variables repression and relative rebel losses to assess
this conditional relationship. The coefficient for the interaction term is positive and
statistically significant across all terrorism outcomes.15 On average, rebel groups are
more likely to adopt terrorism, and to conduct a greater number of attacks, when
fighting against a government with repressive tendencies and when they have experienced
severe losses in the previous month. In contrast, when considered independently, neither
repression nor relative rebel losses can consistently explain insurgents’ adoption of
terrorism. Importantly, in the absence of prior repression, relative rebel losses has a
15Lack of significance in the interaction term does not necessarily imply that the significant
effect is absent over the entire range of the interaction (Ai and Norton 2003; Brambor,
Clark and Golder 2006).
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Table 2 Empirical results for Hypothesis 1
All terrorist attacks Soft civilian targets
Dependent variable: Occurrence Attacks Victims Occurrence Attacks
Repressionmavg,2−5 0.219∗ 0.040 0.485∗∗ 0.133 0.063
(0.103) (0.121) (0.174) (0.110) (0.120)
Relative rebel losseslag −10.827 −11.543 −9.892† −14.690† −8.563
(6.788) (7.287) (5.290) (8.657) (6.768)
Repressionmavg,2−5 × Relative rebel losseslag 3.284† 3.388† 4.228∗∗ 4.309† 2.732†
(1.847) (1.805) (1.456) (2.318) (1.620)
Relative government losseslag 4.764 8.588 17.655 4.357 8.811
(10.194) (14.144) (23.018) (8.365) (13.337)
Rebel group competition −0.532∗∗ −0.631∗∗ −0.400† −0.237† −0.364∗∗
(0.174) (0.152) (0.242) (0.134) (0.130)
Rebel centralized leadership −0.470∗ −0.513∗∗ −0.412 −0.290 −0.393†
(0.204) (0.195) (0.265) (0.235) (0.226)
External support for rebel group 0.284† 0.397∗∗ 0.534∗∗ 0.651∗∗ 0.586∗∗
(0.154) (0.128) (0.198) (0.147) (0.128)
Conflict intensification 0.148∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.555∗∗ 0.090 0.210∗∗
(0.061) (0.070) (0.136) (0.068) (0.078)
Territorial conflict −0.533∗∗ −0.726∗∗ −0.485† −0.408∗ −0.557∗∗
(0.174) (0.188) (0.264) (0.201) (0.190)
Democracy 0.623∗∗ 0.792∗∗ 0.511† 0.353 0.589∗∗
(0.196) (0.191) (0.265) (0.228) (0.199)
GDPlog 0.214
∗ 0.237∗∗ −0.075 0.170† 0.192∗
(0.106) (0.086) (0.142) (0.094) (0.078)
Constant −2.174∗ −1.301† 0.262 −2.292∗∗ −1.850∗
(0.885) (0.720) (1.130) (0.815) (0.776)
Ln(alpha) 0.821∗∗ 2.179∗∗ 0.909∗∗
(0.120) (0.133) (0.140)
Wald χ2 212.82∗∗ 310.85∗∗ 286.41∗∗ 265.98∗∗ 352.97∗∗
AIC 6003.35 14368.75 19056.80 5380.22 10198.49
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −2986.67 −7168.37 −9512.40 −2675.11 −5083.25
Number of clusters 151 151 151 151 151
Number of observations 5762 5762 5762 5762 5762
Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on rebel group.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test). Controls for time dependence not shown.
negative effect on all terrorism outcomes. This suggests that when the government is
perceived as unlikely to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate repression, rebels are
actually less likely to use terrorism even if they have suffered major losses in the previous
month.
To examine the substantive effect of this interaction, we plot the marginal effects.
Figure 2 illustrates these effects for the main three dependent variables. The top row
presents first-difference plots for the effect of a change in past repression from minimum
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Figure 2 Substantive effect of repression over the range of relative rebel losses values
(Hypothesis 1)
(a) First difference graphs
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(b) Contour graphs
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Note: Gray areas in first difference plots indicate 95 percent confidence intervals;
rugs show the distribution of relative rebel losses values.
to maximum (i.e. to indiscriminate) over the range of meaningful values of rebel losses.
The bottom row shows contour plots which visualize the effects for all combinations of
repression and losses values. Across graphs we observe that the effect of an increase in
the severity of military losses on insurgent terrorism is much more pronounced when the
government previously used indiscriminate repression. A change in government repression
from minimum to maximum in situations where rebels have suffered substantial losses16
yields a threefold increase in the probability of terrorism and a 22-fold increase in the
16Two standard deviations above the mean.
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severity of attacks. On the other hand, in the absence of losses there is no significant
difference in the use of terrorism between high and low levels of repression (top row).
These results support our first expectation. A government’s reputation for brutality
increases rebel incentives to carry out terrorism, but only when these rebels have recently
suffered major battlefield losses.
Table 3 presents the results for the second hypothesis, which focuses on the
interaction between out-group antagonism and relative rebel losses. We find that neither
out-group antagonism nor relative rebel losses alone can systematically explain when
insurgents adopt terrorism in civil wars. Instead, the interaction term has a positive
and statistically significant effect across all terrorism outcomes. This suggests that rebel
groups that have strong ties with a specific ethnic or ethnoreligious group are more likely
to carry out terrorism in the month following major military setbacks.
To examine the substantive effect of the interaction, we plot the marginal effects.
Figure 3 visualizes these effects for the main three outcome variables. Given that
out-group antagonism is a binary indicator, the graphs show the first difference in the
probability and expected count and severity of terrorist attacks as out-groups antagonism
increases from 0 to 1 over the range of relative rebel losses.
Figure 3 shows that as insurgents’ military losses in the previous month become
more pronounced, there is a significant difference in the occurrence of terrorist attacks,
the number of attacks, and the number of victims of terrorism between rebel groups with
constituencies characterized by out-group antagonism and those without. Groups with
out-group antagonism who undergo significant military losses17 are 110 percent more
likely to adopt terrorism than their counterparts. The simultaneous presence of these
two conditions also generates a significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks
and civilian killings—156 and 261 percent respectively—in the month following military
losses. However, in the absence of losses these differences are indistinguishable from zero.
17Two standard deviations above the mean.
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Table 3 Empirical results for Hypothesis 2
All terrorist attacks Soft civilian targets
Dependent variable: Occurrence Attacks Victims Occurrence Attacks
Out-group antagonism 0.441† 0.338 0.262 0.499∗ 0.293
(0.227) (0.210) (0.306) (0.239) (0.228)
Relative rebel losseslag −2.333† −3.892∗∗ −1.961 −1.654 −3.224†
(1.404) (1.432) (2.202) (1.231) (1.648)
Out-group antagonism × Relative rebel losseslag 5.130∗∗ 6.076∗∗ 10.340∗∗ 4.390∗∗ 5.976∗∗
(1.723) (1.573) (3.266) (1.657) (1.900)
Relative government losseslag 5.836 7.883 12.203 5.476 8.562
(8.812) (11.228) (22.103) (7.432) (10.860)
Rebel group competition −0.553∗∗ −0.689∗∗ −0.363 −0.292∗ −0.407∗∗
(0.183) (0.157) (0.262) (0.145) (0.127)
Rebel centralized leadership −0.322 −0.427∗ −0.167 −0.150 −0.307
(0.220) (0.188) (0.277) (0.220) (0.215)
External support to rebel group 0.275† 0.399∗∗ 0.533∗∗ 0.644∗∗ 0.580∗∗
(0.158) (0.133) (0.207) (0.148) (0.129)
Conflict intensification 0.142∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.531∗∗ 0.079 0.192∗
(0.060) (0.067) (0.146) (0.067) (0.077)
Territorial conflict −0.786∗∗ −0.903∗∗ −0.737∗ −0.686∗∗ −0.715∗∗
(0.220) (0.207) (0.318) (0.248) (0.195)
Democracy 0.730∗∗ 0.860∗∗ 0.694∗ 0.467∗ 0.651∗∗
(0.206) (0.194) (0.284) (0.235) (0.199)
GDPlog 0.208
† 0.237∗∗ −0.078 0.169† 0.191∗
(0.109) (0.088) (0.145) (0.096) (0.080)
Constant −1.651∗ −1.401∗ 1.839† −2.177∗∗ −1.827∗∗
(0.827) (0.659) (1.022) (0.780) (0.671)
Ln(alpha) 0.814∗∗ 2.200∗∗ 0.905∗∗
(0.121) (0.132) (0.141)
Wald χ2 207.22∗∗ 314.83∗∗ 223.47∗∗ 254.16∗∗ 353.33∗∗
AIC 6009.85 14363.01 19120.60 5374.25 10196.22
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −2989.92 −7165.51 −9544.30 −2672.13 −5082.11
Number of clusters 153 153 153 153 153
Number of observations 5817 5817 5817 5817 5817
Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on rebel group.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 (two-tailed test). Controls for time dependence not shown.
This corroborates our second expectation that the effect of in-group out-group hostility
on rebel terrorism is conditional on battlefield dynamics.
Overall, we find considerable support for the complementarity of specific political
conditions and events on the battlefield in explaining the choice and timing of rebel
terrorism in civil wars. The government’s propensity to repress indiscriminately and
a strong out-group antagonism within the rebels’ constituency increase the expected
effectiveness of terrorist mobilization efforts. Under these permissive conditions, military
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Figure 3 Substantive effect of out-group antagonism over the range of relative rebel
losses values (Hypothesis 2)
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Note: Gray areas indicate 95 percent confidence intervals and rugs show the
distribution of relative rebel losses values.
losses on the battlefield provide unique windows of opportunity which increase rebels’
willingness to rally support by adopting and escalating terrorism.
Exploring the mechanisms: the case of ISIS terrorism
The cross-group analysis has allowed us to provide a generalizable test of our theory. We
now turn to the analysis of a specific case, where our theory is most likely to apply in
order to examine, using more granular data, some of the implied mechanisms underlying
rebels’ mobilization efforts through the (careful) use of terrorism.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is an appropriate case to examine for
several reasons. The group is a direct descendant of al-Qaida in Iraq, whose founder
al-Zarqawi was the first ideologue of the use of sectarian terrorism to spur Sunni
mobilization. Like its predecessor, ISIS makes explicit claims on behalf of Sunni groups,
receives considerable support from Iraqi Sunnis, and has recruited also among Sunnis in
Syria, while demonstrating fierce hostility toward out-groups, especially Shiites, Kurds,
and Christians (e.g. Haykel 2016; Weiss and Hassan 2016). In addition to drawing on its
strong sectarianism, the group was able to resurrect itself in 2012 partly because Iraqi
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prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s policies of persecution and discrimination alienated the
Sunni population, which rallied to the group (Fishman 2016b, 182-197). The combination
of strong sectarianism and repressive government policies against the Sunnis have allowed
the organization to rely on the use of terrorism to attract a stunning number of recruits
(Fishman 2016b, 216-217). In addition, over the last four years ISIS has experienced
increasing military and territorial losses both in Iraq and Syria (ISW 2017; Warrick and
Mekhennet 2016).
Based on our argument, ISIS losses should increase the group’s reliance on terrorist
tactics and shape the temporal variation of attacks. At the same time, our theory also
suggests that the vast majority of such terrorist attacks should be concentrated in areas
populated by out-group members (i.e. non-Sunni and mixed) and not in exclusively
Sunni areas. In fact, an implied mechanism of our mobilization theory is that terrorism is
directed against out-groups in order to provoke harsh responses which radicalize in-group
members and lead them to view the insurgents as their only protector. As it is not feasible
to identify the ethnicity of terrorist targets for thousands of attacks and group-years,
with this case-study we can directly examine our mechanism and rule out the alternative
mechanism whereby groups use terrorism following losses in order to prey on or coerce
constituents (e.g. Wood 2014). Moreover, the Sunnis are politically excluded in both
Iraq and Syria while most of their out-groups are in power (e.g. Shia and Kurds in Iraq
and Alawites in Syria). In line with our first hypothesis, this situation of state-led Sunni
marginalization further boosts ISIS’s optimism about its ability to provoke indiscriminate
government repression.
We estimate the likely ethnicity of ISIS targets by overlaying the geo-coded locations
of ISIS terrorist attacks and the settlement areas of ethnic groups in Syria and Iraq.18
For each day we calculate the number of ISIS attacks that take place in exclusively Sunni
18Data are taken from the GTD and the Geo-EPR (Vogt et al. 2015) respectively.
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areas or non-Sunni and mixed areas which include localities inhabited by Shia, Kurds,
Alawites, and Christians, among others.
We also gather highly disaggregated, daily data on battle-events on the ground,
between ISIS and government forces, and on coalition airstrikes against ISIS in Syria and
Iraq from July to December 2015.19 We combine these into a count variable that reflects
the overall intensity of military operations against ISIS each day. Focusing on the intensity
of battle-events and targeted airstrikes provides a suitable approximation of the severity
of ISIS military losses. It is widely recognized that the material losses experienced by the
group were the product of the combined (and coordinated) effort of military operations
on the ground and of targeted airstrikes against the group’s strongholds to degrade its
capabilities (U.S. Department of State 2017).20
To assess ISIS’s use of terrorism as a function of losses and of the targets’ ethnic
identity we employ a Vector Autoregression model (VAR) (Brandt and Williams 2006;
Enders and Sandler 2012). VAR allows us to examine the endogenous relationship
between ISIS’s military losses—proxied by the intensity of military operations—and the
group’s decision to carry out terrorist attacks against civilians in non-Sunni and mixed
areas.21 We then compare the results with a second model that focuses on ISIS attacks
in exclusively Sunni areas—that is, against in-group members.
19Data on battle-events are taken from the UCDP GED (Sundberg and Melander 2013),
whereas airstrikes data are originally coded from the Operation Inherent Resolve reports
(US Central Command). We provide additional details on the airstrike data in the
appendix.
20We acknowledge that this is not a perfect measure but we note that it is the most highly
disaggregated currently available.
21In a VAR framework, a vector of variables is modeled as depending on their own lags
and the lags of every other variable in the vector. Here, we estimate a two-variable VAR
with two lags based on the likelihood-ratio test and the Akaike Information Criterion.
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Figure 4 VAR orthogonalized impulse-response functions: ISIS terrorist response to a
unit shock in airstrike
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Since a VAR system is an equilibrium representation, the substantive effects are
calculated by examining how shocks propagate to the system. We estimate whether a
positive shock to military operations influenced ISIS’s terrorist response as well as future
operations, and vice versa. Figure 4a presents the results for a shock to military operations
on ISIS terrorist attacks in non-Sunni and mixed areas (i.e. against out-groups). A unit
shock to the overall intensity of military operations against ISIS led to an increase in
ISIS terrorist attacks in the following days. The response peaked around the second
day and remained positive until the fifth day. Figure 4b present the results for our
comparison test; the effect of military operations against ISIS on ISIS attacks against
Sunnis (i.e. the in-group). Consistent with our theory, here we do not find evidence of
a response. When we explore these results further, we find that a common feature of
the locations with the highest number of ISIS terrorist attacks is that they are located
at ethnic, Sunni vs non-Sunni, fault-lines. Because of the proximity of in-group and
out-group, these locations are ideal to foment sectarian hostilities and mobilize in-group
members. Overall, these results bolster our main findings on the relationship between
rebel mobilization efforts, battlefield losses, and the use of terrorism in armed conflicts.
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Robustness and alternative explanations
In this section we briefly discuss some of the additional analyses we conducted to check
the robustness of our findings to alternative explanations and model specifications. We
provide further details in the appendix.
An alternative explanation for our findings may be that an increase in terrorism
is due to an overall increase in insurgents’ fighting efforts. In light of this, we examine
changes in the intensity of battle-events between insurgent and government forces in the
aftermath of insurgents’ battle losses. Consistent with our argument, we find that major
losses reduce insurgents’ reliance on battlefield engagements. Hence, the adoption of
terrorism is not the result of an overall increase in rebels’ fighting efforts but rather a
way to continue fighting and mobilize support when this is needed most.
Moreover, groups might resort to terrorist attacks because of leaders’ lack of
control over the rank and file (i.e. principal-agent problems). Our empirical findings,
however, appear inconsistent with this explanation. If terrorism were purely a product
of insurgents’ lack of discipline, then terrorism’s political costs (i.e. risk of backfiring)
would be irrelevant for explaining this decision. Instead, our results show that rebel
groups that suffered severe losses refrain from adopting terrorism when this is expected
to be politically counterproductive and drive supporters away.
We also conduct supplemental analyses with alternative operationalizations of past
repression, out-group antagonism, rebel losses, and terrorism. We vary the temporal
lags of government repression and use alternative measures of repression from Fjelde and
Hultman (2014) and Fariss (2014). We also restrict our coding of out-group antagonism
to cases where a rebel group’s ethnoreligious constituency is politically excluded, thereby
isolating cases where intergroup hostility is likely to be strongest. In addition, since
the government is a primary opponent of rebel groups, we reestimate our models with a
dependent variable that only captures terrorist attacks against targets directly associated
with the government. We also generate a more fine-grained monthly estimate of the
proportion of rebel troops lost in battle by updating the values of rebel troops at the
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beginning of each month based on rebel troop losses in the previous month. This allows
us to more closely track short-term changes in rebel troops and refine our measure of the
impact of losses in each month. All substantive conclusions remain unchanged.
We further check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional control
variables (e.g. rebel territorial control, rebel strength, a history of rebel violence against
civilians, changes in government leadership). The substantive results remain unaffected by
these changes. Additionally, we control for the (logged) number of government civilian
killings in the previous month to account for the possibility of terrorism arising from
tit-for-tat or direct retaliation strategies as opposed to long-term repressive strategies.
Finally, since repression and out-group antagonism are not mutually exclusive, we
reestimate the models and include a control variable for the other condition that facilitates
rebel groups’ choice of terrorism as a mobilization strategy. All the main findings remain
unchanged.
Conclusion
In this article we have presented a theory of rebel groups’ use of terrorism as a strategy
to mobilize support. At the same time, we have argued that not all rebel groups are
able, and willing, to mobilize support using terrorism. Groups fighting a government
susceptible to provocation, due to a long-term propensity to repress indiscriminately, and
groups with a constituency characterized by strong out-group antagonism stand to benefit
the most from terrorist tactics. When groups are generally optimistic about the effects of
terrorism on support, major military losses operate as a trigger and influence the timing
of terrorist attacks during conflicts.
Our results show that terrorism is not a weapon of last resort for desperate groups.
When groups expect terrorism to potentially backfire and drive supporters away, they do
not adopt such tactics, even if they have recently suffered major military losses on the
battlefield. In other words, and in contrast to what previous studies have found, suffering
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major losses is insufficient, on its own, to motivate the use of terrorism. This casts doubt
on a conventional wisdom according to which terrorism is a weapon of the weak. In our
analysis, those insurgent groups that are truly weak—that is, those groups who suffer
major losses and expect high political costs from the use of terrorism—are actually less
likely to resort to this tactic. Our results are consistent across both the macro and micro
levels of analysis and across different operationalizations of terrorism.
This study shows the advantages of combining research on terrorism and on civil
war. Linking insights from both literatures improves our understanding of terrorism as
a tactic in a context where rebel groups can choose among several tactical options and
repertoires. It also allows us to systematically explain variation in the use of terrorism
across conflicts, rebels groups, and time. Moreover, our findings on the joint effect of
specific political conditions and battlefield dynamics in explaining terrorism constitute
an important complement to existing studies which have overlooked such interactions.
Our findings have implications for research on counterinsurgency and on conflict
duration. Previous studies have argued that rebels’ use of terrorism constitutes a signal
of successful counterinsurgency (e.g. Johnson 1962; Kilcullen 2010). However, while this
argument suggests that terrorism may stem from governments’ effectiveness at weakening
rebels’ military capacity, it overlooks the competition for political support (i.e. for
hearts and minds). Although rebels who use terrorism do not necessarily win conflicts,
the mobilization effect of terrorism becomes a critical source of insurgents’ power to
resist. This is likely to generate much longer civil wars, which can be very draining for
governments. The case of ISIS (and of its predecessors) is quite telling in this regard.
The organization has been able to resurrect itself several times, even after major military
defeats, in part thanks to strategically orchestrated terrorist campaigns (Fishman 2016a).
The findings in this study also have more practical implications. They can help
us anticipate when, where, and against whom rebels groups are more likely to use terror
tactics. Understanding the effect of battlefield losses allows us to anticipate when terrorist
attacks can be expected to occur during civil war. The political conditions that we show to
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benefit rebel groups enable us to identify which groups are more prone to adopt terrorism,
as well as the likely targets. As a result, governments can be better prepared to assess
the risk of terrorist attacks and avoid counterproductive responses.
There are a number of avenues for future research. Our dataset links actors in
civil war and in terrorism databases to bring together information on a large set of
violent tactics and targeting strategies. Future studies will be able to build on this and
explore the full range of rebel groups’ strategies and tactical choices, including insurgents’
non-violent activities (e.g. social service provision, Mampilly 2011). A promising
avenue for future research would therefore be to analyze patterns of complementarity,
substitution, and temporal sequencing between different violent and nonviolent tactics
in civil war. Moreover, rebel groups’ incentives to mobilize support through the use of
terrorism may extend beyond the local context. As a consequence it will be important to
examine how rebel terrorist attacks can affect international audiences, external support,
and the behavior of third-party actors.
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